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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nathan R. Bagshaw appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, claiming evidentiary error by the district court and fundamental error
in relation to the prosecutor’s closing arguments.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
During the evening of October 27, 2014, Deputy Humphreys pulled over a
speeding vehicle. (Tr., p.121, Ls.11-23.) Bagshaw was a passenger in the vehicle.
(Tr., p.124, L.6 – p.128, L.5.) The officer noticed that Bagshaw was smoking and had a
pack of cigarettes in his hand. (Tr., p.125, Ls.16-24.) Bagshaw was attempting to hide
his face from the officer as the officer made contact with the driver. (Tr., p.123, Ls.4-6.)
The officer asked for Bagshaw’s name and date of birth, and Bagshaw gave him a false
identity. (Tr., p.123, L.13 – p.124, L.13.) The officer asked Bagshaw to exit the vehicle
for further questioning. (Tr., p.124, Ls.14-17.)
As Bagshaw exited, rather than join the officer at the back of the vehicle, he
hurried to the front of the vehicle. (Tr., p.126, L.20 – p.127, L.3.) The officer asked
Bagshaw to come to the back of the vehicle, and he complied. (Tr., p.127, Ls.3-15.)
The officer confronted Bagshaw about his false identification, and Bagshaw ultimately
admitted his true identity. (Tr., p.127, L.16 – p.128, L.5.) The officer ran Bagshaw’s
name through dispatch and it came back with several active warrants. (Tr., p.128,
Ls.13-23.) Deputy Humphreys placed Bagshaw under arrest. (Tr., p.128, Ls.24-25.)
After placing Bagshaw under arrest, the officer returned to the vehicle and told
the driver that he was free to go. (Tr., p.129, L.18 – p.130, L.8.) After the vehicle drove
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away, Deputy Humphreys noticed a pack of cigarettes on the ground near where
Bagshaw had been after he was asked to exit the vehicle. (Tr., p.130, Ls.9-15.) Inside
the cigarette pack, officers found a small baggy filled with a white crystal substance.
(Tr., p.132, Ls.1-4.) The substance was sent to the Idaho State Lab and tested positive
for methamphetamine. (Tr., p.132, Ls.12-19; State’s Ex. 3.)
The state charged Bagshaw with possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.30.)
Bagshaw pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.40-43, 138-42.)
Following the trial, the jury found Bagshaw guilty of the possession charge. (R., p.136.)
The district court entered judgment against Bagshaw and sentenced him to a unified
term of seven years with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.162-64.)
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Bagshaw on
probation for a period of five years. (R., supp., pp.4-5.) Bagshaw filed a timely notice of
appeal from his judgment of conviction. (R., pp.166-67.)
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ISSUES
Bagshaw states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the audio of
the traffic stop, in which Mr. Bagshaw lied about his name and birthday,
because it was not relevant to the possession charge and was unduly
prejudicial?
II.
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by telling the jury that Mr.
Bagshaw knew where to walk to get out of the view of the dash camera?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Bagshaw failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the audio portion of the traffic stop into evidence?
2.
Has Bagshaw failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of his claim
of prosecutorial misconduct?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Bagshaw Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Admitting The Audio Portion Of The Traffic Stop Into Evidence
A.

Introduction
In a motion in limine prior to trial, Bagshaw sought to exclude the audio portion of

his traffic stop, during which he lied to the officer about his identity. (R., pp.94-98.)
Bagshaw argued that the only reason he lied to the officer was to avoid an arrest
warrant, and that his misrepresentation of identity was therefore irrelevant to his
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine and would “unfairly prejudice his
case.” (Tr., p.1, L.9 – p.2, L.15; p.93, L.7 – p.95, L.3.) The state argued that the audio
was probative of Bagshaw’s consciousness of guilt and should therefore be admitted.
(Tr., p.88, L.7 – p.92, L.18.) After reconsidering its ruling, the district court recognized
that “evidence can be admissible for more than one purpose,” and went on to explain:
“The evidence is certainly relevant to any claim that [Bagshaw] did not want to be
arrested on the warrant. It’s certainly also relevant to the circumstantial evidence of
guilt that he—consciousness of guilt.” (Tr., p.97, L.21 – p.98, L.2.) Recognizing its
discretion, the district court admitted the audio portion as circumstantial evidence of
Bagshaw’s guilt. (Tr., p.98, Ls.3-15.)
On appeal, Bagshaw argues that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the audio from the traffic stop. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.) Application of the
correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no abuse of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The relevancy of evidence is an issue of law subject to free review. State v.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). Once relevance has
been established, the district court’s determination that the evidence’s probative value is
not outweighed by unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603, 809 P.2d 455, 464 (1991).
C.

The Probative Value Of Bagshaw’s Lying To Officers About His Identity, Which
Shows His Consciousness Of Guilt, Is Not Outweighed By Unfair Prejudice
The Rules of Evidence generally govern the admissibility of all evidence in the

State of Idaho. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2009).
“I.R.E. 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing ...
consciousness of guilt.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 279, 77 P.3d 956, 968
(2003). Behavior demonstrating a consciousness of guilt encompasses a wide range of
acts, which include the “use of false identification or aliases, or otherwise
misrepresenting one’s identity.” 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 318 (2014); see also United
States v. Carrillo-Valenzuela, 177 Fed.Appx. 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of
false names is generally admissible to show consciousness of guilt or intent to evade
law enforcement.”). Because Bagshaw’s repeated lying to the police about his identity
was indicative of his consciousness of guilt, it was relevant.
On appeal, Bagshaw asserts that his misrepresentations were not relevant to his
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine because he was only lying about his
identity to avoid an arrest warrant.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)

This argument is

contrary to the applicable legal standards and therefore fails. Bagshaw’s argument
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requires the jury to accept his explanation for his actions, something the jury was not
required to do. Moreover, even if the jury did accept that Bagshaw was motivated at
least in part by a desire to avoid arrest on a warrant, that would not be exclusive of
additional motivations, such as being searched incident to that arrest.

Whether

Bagshaw may have had additional, “non-inculpatory” reasons for lying to the police is
therefore not relevant to the admission of evidence which establishes his consciousness
of guilt. “When evidence that is offered to establish consciousness of guilt also supports
non-inculpatory inferences, this goes to the weight, not the relevance of the evidence.”
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 917, 354 P.3d 462, 480 (2015) (citing Sheahan, 139
Idaho at 279, 77 P.3d at 968).
Apparently recognizing that the evidence at least could have been probative of
his consciousness of guilt, Bagshaw nevertheless argues that the audio recording
should have been excluded for being unfairly prejudicial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.)
This argument also fails. Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may be
excluded if, in the district court’s discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248
P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct.
App. 2011). “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a
defendant’s case.

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an

improper basis.” Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870, 264 P.3d at 977. “Under the rule, the
evidence is only excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of
relevant evidence.” State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3
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(1990) (emphasis in original). Absent a clear abuse of discretion in weighing potential
prejudice against relevance, a district court’s determination under Rule 403 will not be
disturbed on appeal. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991).
Contrary to Bagshaw’s argument, evidence that Bagshaw lied to police is not
unfairly prejudicial and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that
evidence. Evidence showing a consciousness of guilt is evidence of the fact of guilt
itself.

United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations

omitted).

Evidence indicative of a defendant’s guilt is a proper basis on which to

premise a finding of guilt. Therefore, while the state agrees that evidence showing
Bagshaw lied about his identity when confronted by police is prejudicial—because it
demonstrates Bagshaw’s consciousness of guilt—the evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial. Because Bagshaw has failed to show any unfair prejudice arising from
admission of the traffic stop’s audio recording, he has failed to show any abuse of the
district court’s discretion.1
Furthermore, even if the court had abused its discretion by admitting the audio
recording of the traffic stop, any error in admission would necessarily be harmless
because there is additional evidence that Bagshaw lied to police, which Bagshaw has
not challenged on appeal. During Bagshaw’s trial, Deputy Humphreys testified that
Bagshaw initially lied about his identity. (Tr., p.123, L.13 – p.124, L.13; p.127, L.16 –
p.128, L.5.) While Bagshaw sought to exclude this testimony through his motion in

1

Though the state believes there is no potential for unfair prejudice in admitting the
audio recording, even if there were, such would not substantially outweigh the
recording’s highly probative value as evidence of Bagshaw’s guilt.
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limine below (see Tr., p.9, Ls.13-23), he has failed to challenge its admission on appeal
(see Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11).
Moreover, the evidence of Bagshaw’s guilt was overwhelming: While Bagshaw
was inside the vehicle, the officer saw him holding the same red and white cigarette
carton that was later discovered on the road near where Bagshaw had been standing.
(Tr., p.142, L.24 – p.144, L.6; compare State’s Ex. 1 (red and white cigarette carton)
with Tr., p.125, Ls.23-24 (officer testifies, “I noticed a pack of cigarettes in his hand, a
red and white pack of cigarettes.”).)
The district court correctly concluded that the audio evidence which showed
Bagshaw’s consciousness of guilt was relevant, and properly exercised its discretion in
admitting the audio portion of the traffic stop. Bagshaw has failed to show an abuse of
the district court’s discretion. Even had the court abused its discretion, any error in
admitting the audio recording—where unchallenged evidence also shows Bagshaw was
lying to the police and the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming—would necessarily
be harmless. The district court should be affirmed.
II.
Bagshaw Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Review Of His Claim
Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
At trial, Bagshaw’s defense against the methamphetamine possession charge

was that the unweathered and clean cigarette carton containing methamphetamine,
found on the ground near where Bagshaw stood during a traffic stop, did not belong to
Bagshaw. (See Tr., p.173, L.19 – p.175, L.12.) The state’s theory of the evidence was
that the container in fact belonged to Bagshaw and that he tried to get rid of it when he
8

was asked to exit the pulled over vehicle. (See Tr., p.170, L.19 – p.173, L.2.) During
closing arguments, the prosecutor explained:
What we do know is that Nathan Bagshaw was the passenger of
that van on that evening.
What we do know is that Nathan Bagshaw got out of the van and
walked to the front of the van and paused. He walked to the front of the
van out of the light and out of the camera view.
What we do know is that he has been pulled over several times, is
his testimony, and he knows better where to walk to get out of the view of
the camera.
We know what he paused for. We know that his last-ditch effort on
getting rid of the methamphetamine was his only hope on not getting
caught. This is all we know, and this is what we’ve learned today.
(Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.9.)
For the first time on appeal, Bagshaw claims that the prosecutor’s statements
constitute misconduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.) Application of the correct legal
standards to the record, however, shows that Bagshaw has failed to show error, much
less fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue.
B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an

alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226,
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct
For the first time on appeal, Bagshaw asserts that the prosecutor committed

misconduct when he drew the inference that Bagshaw knew how to avoid being viewed
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in dash cameras from his many times being pulled over and the fact that he got out of
view of the dash camera for a period of time during his traffic stop. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.11-13.)

Because he did not preserve this issue below, he is required to show

fundamental error on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To establish
fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Because review of the record shows that the prosecutor’s
argument was not inappropriate, Bagshaw has failed to show error, much less
fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved claim.
First, Bagshaw argues that the prosecutor’s statement constituted misconduct
because it was not factually supported. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) Prosecutors enjoy a
considerable amount of latitude in closing argument and may fully discuss the evidence
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77
P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (emphasis added). The prosecutor’s comment, that Bagshaw
knew where to stand to avoid the dash camera, is an inference drawn from the
evidence. The evidence established that when asked by the officer to exit the vehicle,
rather than join the officer at the back of the vehicle, Bagshaw hurried to the front of the
vehicle. (Tr., p.126, L.20 – p.127, L.3.) Bagshaw’s movement was not casual, but
appeared suspicious. (See id.) And Bagshaw’s testimony confirmed that he had been
in several traffic stops. (See Tr., p.159, Ls.13-20.)
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Though Bagshaw’s attorney was free to argue other inferences, the evidence
supported the prosecutor’s inference that Bagshaw deliberately hurried to the front of
the vehicle because, having been in several traffic stops, he knew he would be out of
view of the dash camera. As noted above, Bagshaw was attempting to subvert the
police investigation—both by giving a false name and by his apparent efforts to avoid
being recorded while discarding contraband during the traffic stop. That Bagshaw went
off camera deliberately is an inference that can be drawn from the evidence; arguing
that inference was therefore not error, much less fundamental error.
Bagshaw also claims on appeal that the prosecutor’s comments were
inappropriate because “the prosecutor’s claim improperly implied that Mr. Bagshaw’s
earlier traffic stops led to criminal charges serious enough that he viewed dash camera
videos, and thus knew exactly where the cameras are located and what they film.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.) Even assuming the prosecutor’s inference, drawn from the
evidence presented at trial, could make such an implication, that could not constitute
fundamental error. To meet the burden of fundamental error, Bagshaw must show that
the error is clear on the record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. An “implied”
error, by definition, cannot be “clear on the record.”
Bagshaw has failed to show that, by arguing an inference from the evidence
during closing argument, the prosecutor erred, much less committed misconduct arising
to the level of fundamental error. Having failed to show fundamental error, Bagshaw is
not entitled to review of this unpreserved issue on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bagshaw’s conviction for
possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016.

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer_
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of May, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

RJS/dd

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer_
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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